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AN UNCIVEL ACTION: THE SUPREME COURT DILUTES THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
NationalAssociation ofHomebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife'
I.

INTRODUCTION

A fuller recognition of human impact on the environment became
prevalent when Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"): 2
"a comprehensive science-based approach to protecting the United States'
most vulnerable species and the ecosystems upon which these species
depend." 3 President Richard Nixon signed the ESA into effect on
December 28, 1973 and noted "[n]othing is more priceless and more
worthy of preservation than the rich array of animal life with which our
country has been blessed. It is a many-faceted treasure, [of] value to
scholars, scientists, and nature lovers alike and it forms a vital part of the
heritage we all share as Americans." 4 Congress justified the ESA as a
means "to conserve species facing extinction... these species of fish,
wildlife, and plants are of aesthetic, educational, historical, recreational
and scientific value to the nation and its people."5
Congress was
concerned "economic growth and development untempered by
conservation [had] led to many species' decline and even extinction." 6
While some see the preservation of endangered species as a hindrance
to economic progress, scientists have begun to realize that many species
are vital to economic progress, and the destruction of these species
negatively impacts economies.
For example, "in 1997, scientists
estimated the total economic value of the renewable ecosystem services
1Nat'1 Ass'n of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007)
[hereinafter Defenders II].
2 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
Brief for Jared M. Diamond et al. as AmiciAmicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3,
Nat'l Ass'nNational Association of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct.
2518 (2007) (Nos. 06-549, 06-340)[hereinafter Brief for Jared M. Diamond].
4 Id. at 5 (citing BONNIE B. Burgess, Fate of the Wild: the Endangered Species Act and
the Future of Biodiversity 3 (2001)).
5Id. at 5-6 (citing 16 USC § 153 1(a)(3) (2000)).
6Id. at 6 (citing 16 USC § 153 1(a)(1)).
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important to human health and welfare as between $16 and $54 trillion per
year."7 An example of conservation's economic benefits to people is New
York's expenditure of "over a billion dollars to purchase forested lands in
the Catskills watershed to provide the city with drinking water - thereby
avoiding $6 to $8 billion in costs for a mechanical water filtration
system." However, any financial estimate of the renewable ecosystem's
value to humans will be inaccurate because it will fail to factor the value
of human survival. Without these renewable systems, humans would not
survive, and it is the ESA's strong and comprehensive mandate which has
protected the organisms that compose these valuable ecosystems.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In February of 2002, the State of Arizona applied to the EPA for a
transfer of permitting authority pursuant to section 1342 of the Clean
Water Act ("CWA"). The EPA consulted with the Fishery and Wildlife
Service "to determine whether the transfer of permitting authority would
adversely affect any listed species" in Arizona. 9 The FWS concluded that
a transfer of permitting authority would not have a directly adverse impact
on any listed species, but might result in the "issuance of more discharge
permits."' 0 The FWS feared more discharge permits could "lead to more
development", which could indirectly, adversely impact the habitat of
endangered species." Because section 7(a)(2)'s consultation requirement
applies to "action[s] authorized, funded, or carried out by Federal
agenc[ies]", the FWS worried that Arizona state officials could issue
permits "without considering and mitigating their indirect impact...."l2
However, the EPA felt the "link between the transfer of permitting
7Id. at

7-8 (citing Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services
and Natural Capital, 387 Nature 253-60 (1997)). "The study's authors calculated that the
estimated annual value of ecosystem services at the time, $33 trillion, was 1.8 times the
global gross national product. In the U.S., there is a growing awareness of the economic
and practical importance of ecosystem services." Id. n.2.
8
Id.at 8 n.2. See EDWARD 0. Wilson, The Future of Life 107-08 (Knopf 2002).
9 Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at 2526-27.
'oId. at 2527.
" Id. The FWS was concerned about the "habitat of certain upland species, such as the
cactus ferruginous pygmy-owl, and Pima pineapple cactus." Id.
12 Id.
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authority and the potential harm that could result from increased
development was too attenuated."' 3 Because Section 402(b) of the CWA
requires the EPA to approve a transfer of permitting authority if section
402(b)'s nine criteria are satisfied, the EPA believed section 402(b)
"stripped them of authority to disapprove a transfer based on any other
considerations."l4 These other considerations would include a proposed
permit's effect on endangered species.
In December 2002, the FWS delivered its "biological opinion", which
reached the opposite conclusion of its initial consultation with the EPA:
that the transfer of permitting authority would not indirectly jeopardize
endangered species. 5 The FWS reasoned:
[L]oss of any conservation benefit is not caused by EPA's decision
to approve the State of Arizona's program. Rather the absence of
the section 7 process that exists with respect to Federal NPDES
permits reflects Congress' decision to grant States the right to
administer these programs under state law provided the State's
program meets the requirements of [§] 402(b) of the Clean Water
Act. 16
Additionally, because the EPA would continue its oversight of Arizona's
program, "along with other statutory protections", the FWS believed that
the listed species and their habitats would be adequately protected."
Arizona met the nine statutory criteria under section 402(b) of the CWA",
13 id.
I14id.

15 Id.
16id.
17id.

33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b) (1)-(9). The nine criteria are the state's ability:
(1) to issue fixed-term permits that apply and ensure compliance with the
CWA's substantive requirements and which are revocable for cause; (2) to
inspect, monitor, and enter facilities and the require reports to the extent
required by the CWA; (3) to provide for public notice and public hearings; (4) to
ensure that the EPA receives notice of each permit application; (5) to ensure that
any other State whose waters may be affected by the issuance of a permit is
issued if the Army Corps of Engineers concludes that it would substantially
impair the anchoring and navigation of navigable waters; (7) to abate violations
of permits or the permit program, including through civil and criminal penalties;
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and the EPA granted the transfer of permitting authority, noting "the
issuance of the FWS's biological opinion had 'conclude[d] the
consultation process required by ESA section 7(a)(2) and reflects the
[FWS'] agreement with the EPA that the approval of the State program
meets the substantive requirements of the ESA."l 9
Plaintiffs and Defenders of Wildlife, Center for Biological
Diversity, and Craig Miller, a resident of Pima County, Arizona
("Defenders") filed a lawsuit in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit challenging the EPA's decision to transfer permitting
authority to Arizona. 20 The Ninth Circuit suit sought to review the EPA's
grant of permitting authority, alleging the EPA's transfer decision was
arbitrary and capricious and the EPA had erred in not considering the
transfer of permitting authority's impact on endangered species as
required by the ESA. 2 1
The Defenders of Wildlife also filed an action in United States
District Court for the District of Arizona, "alleging.. .the biological
opinion issued by the FWS in support of the proposed transfer did not
comply with the ESA's standards." 22 The action in the District Court
concerns the ESA and the Administrative Procedure Act, "alleging... the
Biological Opinion supporting the pollution permitting transfer does not
comply with Endangered Species Act standards." 23 The United States
District Court for the District of Arizona severed the claim and transferred
the suit to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit holding
that the Circuit court has "exclusive jurisdiction over the Biological
Opinion challenge pursuant to [Title 13, section 1369(b)(1)(D) of the

(8) to ensure that any permit works for a discharge from a publicly owned
treatment works includes conditions requiring the identification of the type and
volume of certain pollutants; and (9) to ensure that any industrial user of any
publicly owned treatment works will comply with certain of the CWA's
substantive provisions.
Id.
19
20 Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at 2527-28.
Id. at 2528.
21 Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946, 977954
(9th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter
Defenders I].
22 Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at 2528 (citing Defenders
I, 420 F.3d at 954).
23
Id. at 2528.
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United States Code]...."24 The United States District Court for the District
of Arizona case was consolidated with Defender's first suit challenging
the EPA transfer in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.2 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held the
EPA's decision was arbitrary and capricious because "the EPA relied
during the administrative proceedings on legally contradictory positions
regarding its section 7 obligations." 26 The Ninth Circuit decided "it was
required to 'remand to the agency for a plausible explanation of its
decision...."'27 Instead of allowing the EPA to explain its decision, the
panel majority proceeded "to review EPA's substantive construction of the
statutes at issue and held that the ESA granted the EPA both the power
and duty to determine whether its transfer decision would jeopardize
threatened or endangered species." The panel majority ruled in favor of
plaintiffs, Defenders, "dismiss[ing] the argument that the EPA's approval
of the transfer application was not subject to § 7(a)(2) because it was not a
'discretionary action' within the meaning of 50 CFR § 402.03...."28 The
Ninth Circuit granted Defenders' petition and "vacated the EPA's transfer
decision." 29
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and remanded the
Ninth Circuit's decision 30 and held the EPA's action was not arbitrary and
capricious. The EPA's decision -- that it only had to consult with other
federal agencies to determine the impact of agency action of endangered
species when the federal action was "discretionary" -- deserved deference
because it is the agency's reasonable interpretation of its own
regulations.32 Finally, the EPA's transfer of permitting authority to
Arizona was not a "discretionary" action within the meaning of Title 50,
Defenders I, 420 F.3d at 955.
Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at 2528 (citing Defenders I, 420
F.3d at 962).
26 Defenders
, 127 S. Ct. at 2528.
27
Id. (citing Defenders I, 420 F.3d at 962).
28
Id. (citing Defenders I, 420 F.3d at 967-969).
29 Defenders 11, 127 S.
Ct. at 2528.
3
24
25

1Id. at

2525.

31 Id. at
32

2529.
Id. at 2537-38.
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section 402.03 of the Code of Federal Regulations, so EPA did not have to
meet the consultation or no-jeopardy requirements of the ESA.3 3
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

As Justice Alito stated in the introduction to the majority's opinion
in Defenders II, "these cases concern the interplay between two federal
environmental statutes." 34 This statutory interpretation issue required the
Supreme Court "to mediate a clash of seemingly categorical-and, at first
glance, irreconcilable legislative commands:" the Clean Water Act of
197235 ("CWA") and the Endangered Species Act of 197336 ("ESA"). 37
The Supreme Court characterized the issue as whether section 7(a)(2) of
the ESA added a tenth criterion to the CWA's nine-pronged test for
granting a state permitting authority. 3 8 Even before the issue reached the
Ninth Circuit in Defenders I, the Fifth and District of Columbia circuits
had considered interplay between the CWA and the ESA. In Defenders II,
the Supreme Court also considered whether the Ninth Circuit's ruling in
Defenders I -- that the EPA's reliance on "legally contradictory positions
regarding [their] section 7 obligations" -- had been arbitrary and

capricious. 39
A. The Clean Water Act of 1972.
After analyzing whether the EPA's action had been arbitrary and
capricious, the Supreme Court in Defenders II began its statutory analysis
by turning first to the language of the CWA. The CWA created a National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES"),4 0 which was
designed to prohibit the "discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters"

" Id. at 2538.
34
Id. at 2524.
" 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1972).
36
36 Codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2000).
n Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at 2531.
31 See id. at 2525.
39
Id. at 2529.
40 Codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342 (2000).
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The Environmental
through the issuance of regulating permits.41
Protection Agency ("EPA") administers the NPDES permitting system
and is responsible for "reviewing and approving" discharge permits.42 A
state may apply for a transfer of permitting authority from the EPA, but
even after a state assumes permitting authority, the EPA could still deny
permits that the state proposes to issue.4 3 Pursuant to section 402(b) of the
CWA, a state requesting permitting authority must submit to the EPA a
description of the state's proposed program and a certification that the
state's laws "provide adequate authority to carry out the described
program."44 The EPA then makes a determination whether a state has
adequate authority to satisfy nine specified criteria. 45 If a state meets the
nine criteria, the EPA "shall" approve the transfer pursuant to section

1432(b). 46
B. The EndangeredSpecies Act of 1973
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 ("ESA") is designed "to protect
and conserve endangered and threatened species and their habitats."4 7
Under the jurisdiction of the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior
respectively, the Fish and Wildlife Services ("FWS") and the National
Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") administer the ESA.4 8 The section of
the ESA at issue in Defenders II, 7(a)(2), directs federal agencies to
consult with the Secretary of Commerce or the Interior to "insure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency...is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species." 49
41 33
42

U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(1) (2000).

Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at 2525; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1).
4' 33 U.S.C. § 1342. The State must advise the EPA of each permit it proposes to issue,
and the EPA may object to any permit. Id. § 1342(d)(1), (2); see also 40 C.F.R. §
123.44(c) (2006). If the state cannot address the EPA's concerns, permitting authority

reverts to the EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(4).
4433 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
45 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
46

id.
Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at 2526 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000)).
48 Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at 2526 ; see 50 C.F.R § 17.11 (2006).
49 Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at 2526 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)).
47
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After completion of the section 7(a)(2) consultation process, "the
Secretary is required to give the agency a written biological opinion
'setting forth the Secretary's opinion and a summary of the information
on
which the opinion is based, detailing how the agency action affects the
species or its critical habitat."' 5 0 If proposed agency action could "place a
listed species in jeopardy or adversely modify its critical habitat, 'the
Secretary shall suggest those reasonable and prudent alternatives which he
believes would not violate [§ 7(a)(2)]... in implementing the agency
action.'" 5
Those reasonable and .rudent alternatives the Secretary
suggests are the "jeopardy opinion." 2 After the Secretary issues the
jeopardy opinion, "the agency must either terminate the action, implement
the proposed alternative, or seek an exemption from the Cabinet level
Endangered Species Committee pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)." 5 3
C. The Debate over the ESA's Conflict with FederalStatutes
Petitioner, National Homebuilders Association of America ("NAHB"),
disagreed with respondent, Defenders, whether the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Defenders I had created an inter-circuit conflict in how to treat
the interplay between section 402(b) of the CWA and section 7 of the
ESA. In its petition for certiorari in Defenders II, Petitioner NAHB
contended the Ninth Circuit's decision in Defenders I had created a
conflict 54 , while respondents Defenders of Wildlife contended it had not.ss
In support of an inter-circuit conflict, the NAHB pointed to decisions from
the Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits respectively: Platte River
Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maintenance Trust v. Federal Energy

50

Defenders II 2526 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(a)).

51 Id.
52

Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at 2526.

53 Id.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Defenders H, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (No. 06-340)
[hereinafter Petition for Writ of Certiorari].
ss Brief of Defenders of Wildlife, et al. inOpposition to Petitions for a Writ
of Certiorari
at 18, Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (Nos. 06-340, 06-549) 2007 WL 3419815
[hereinafter Brief Opposing Writ of Certiorari].
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Regulation Commission56 ("Platte River") and American Forest & Paper
Association v. EPA5 7 ("AFPA").58 Defenders contended these decisions
"do not directly conflict with [the Ninth Circuit's decision in Defenders 1],
let alone support EPA's new position that Section 7(a)(2) has no bearing
on NPDEA transfer decisions." 59
The D.C. Circuit case, Platte River, discussed the "need for wildlife
protective conditions in the annual licenses issued to two hydroelectric
power projects on the Platte River." 60 The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission consulted with the Fisheries and Wildlife Service ("FWS")
and "largely did adopt FWS' recommendations." 6 ' Because FERC had
already consulted with the FWS, the court "was not called on to decide
whether section 7(a)(2) could be avoided entirely; in particular, the court
did not address any contention that FERC was authorizing actions that
would, in violation of Section 7(a)(2), jeopardize the continued existence
of any listed species or destroy any critical habitat." 62 The D.C. Circuit
"focused its analysis not on Section 7(a)(2) but, rather, on... Section
7(a)(1). 63 Section 7(a)(1) "imposes a separate obligation on federal
agencies to take affirmative steps to 'utilize their authorities in furtherance
of the purposes [of the ESA]' by carrying out 'programs for the
conservation' of species." 64
A Fifth Circuit decision, American Forest and Paper Ass'n v. EPA
("AFPA"), considered the EPA's grant of permitting authority under the
NPDES to Louisiana.
This case considered the issue whether the EPA
and the FWS could condition the transfer of permitting authority on
"Louisiana's agreement to enter binding consultations with the FWS on all
s6 Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maintenance Trust v. FERC, 962 F.2d
27 (D.C. Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Platte River].
* Am. Forest & Paper Ass'n v. EPA, 137 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter AFPA]
58 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 54, at 11. While
the Ninth Circuit
interpreted section 7 of the ESA as a discretionary action in Defenders I, the NAHB
contended other circuits interpreted section 7 as mandatory and non-discretionary. Id.
5 Brief Opposing Writ of Certiorari, supra note 55, at 18.
60 Platte River, 962 F.2d at 30.
61Id. at 33 n.2.
62 Brief Opposing Writ of Certiorari, supra note
55, at 18-19.
63 Id.
at 19.
6 Id. at 19-20 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1)).
65 AFPA, 137 F.3d 291 ( th Cir.
1998).
5
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State issued permits after the transfer."66 The Fifth Circuit rejected the
EPA's argument "that it could impose a condition on Louisiana that the
court believed was not authorized by the CWA or the ESA."6 7 The Fifth
Circuit stated, "whether the EPA's approval of Louisiana's permitting
program constitutes 'agency' action is largely beside the point." 68 The
Fifth Circuit concluded that the EPA must consult with the FWS 69 , and if
the FWS says that an endangered species will be in jeopardy as a result of
a transfer of permitting authority, the EPA would need to resort to the
Endangered Species Committee. 70
IV. INSTANT DECISION

A. The Majority
The United States Supreme Court considered whether the EPA's grant
of transfer authority had been arbitrary and capricious because the EPA
had not followed the ESA's mandate in considering impact on listed
species, but rather only established that the state receiving permitting
authority had satisfied the CWA's nine criteria.7 1 If the EPA's decision
was arbitrary and capricious, the Supreme Court noted the Ninth Circuit
should have remanded the decision to the EPA for the agency's
explanation of its decision.7 2 However, because the Supreme Court found
the Ninth Circuit's determination that the EPA had been arbitrary and
capricious was not supported by the record, it passed on analyzing the
Ninth Circuit's decision not to remand the case back to the EPA for
clarification.7 3

66

Brief Opposing Writ of Certiorari, supra note 55, at 20. (citing AFPA, 137 F.3d at
29394).
67
Id. at 21.
68 AFPA, 137 F.3d at
298 n. 6.
69
Id. at 298.
70 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e).
7n Defenders II, 127 S.Ct. 2518, 2529
(2007).
72

id.

7 Id.
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Courts should give deferential review to reasonable agency
interpretations of their regulations. 74 Courts should not give deference to
an agency interpretation if an agency relies on factors it is not supposed to
consider pursuant to Congress' intent, completely ignores a significant
facet of the issue, issues a decision in defiance of available evidence, or
"is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or
Even though the EPA relied on
the product of agency expertise."7
inconsistent legal grounds during its consideration of the grant of
permitting authority, federal courts typically review only an agency's final
decision and not an interim decision.7 6 The Supreme Court disagreed with
Defenders' contention that the EPA's later position that a grant of
permitting authority did not activate section 7's consultation requirement
and that this constituted inconsistency within the EPA's decisionmaking.7 7
In considering the apparent clash between section 7 of the ESA
and section 402(b) of the CWA, the Supreme Court noted that section
402(b) uses the language "shall approve," implying the EPA must grant
the transfer of permitting authority unless the nine criteria are not
satisfied.
This, the Supreme Court concluded, meant the EPA did not
have the discretion to deny a transfer if the nine criteria were fulfilled.79
However, the language of section 7 of the ESA is likewise mandatory.8 0 It
instructs federal agencies to consult with the Secretary to "insure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency...is not likely to
jeopardize endangered or threatened species or their habitats." 8 ' Under
this construction, section 7 of the ESA would add the consultation
requirement to the nine criteria of section 402(b) of the CWA.
While the two statutes seem at odds, construing one to impliedly
repeal the other is not favored in law. 82 Only if the "intention of the
74 id.
75 id.

76

Id. at 2530.

77 id.
78

Id. at 2531.

79id.

s Id. at 2532.
81 Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)).
82

Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at 2532.
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legislature to repeal is clear and manifest" will a court presume one statute
to repeal another. 83 The Supreme Court characterizes the Ninth Circuit's
treatment of section 7 of the ESA as an unfavorable repealing of portions
of the statutory mandates within section 402(b) of the CWA.8 4 Under the
Ninth Circuit's construction, section 7 of the ESA would implicitly
"partially override every federal statute mandating agency action by
subjecting such action to the further condition that it pose no jeopardy to
endangered species." 85 The Supreme Court adopted the view that section
7 of the ESA should only apply to "actions in which there is discretionary
Federal involvement or control." 86 Under this interpretation, section 7 of
the ESA would still require agencies to consider impact on endangered
species in its discretionary action and section 7 of the ESA would not
repeal statutory mandates. 8 7
B. The Dissent
The dissent began by emphasizing the holding of TVA v. Hill
("Hill")88 which prioritized the protection of endangered species "over the
'primary missions' of federal agencies." 89 The dissent discussed various
ways to reconcile the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act
without an erroneous reliance on federal regulation. The dissent criticized
the majority for relying on title 50, section 402.03 of the Code of Federal
Regulations "as limiting the reach of section 7(a)(2) to only discretionary
federal actions...."90 The dissent characterized this interpretation as
"inconsistent with the text and history of section 402.03" and
"fundamentally inconsistent with the ESA itself."9 1 The dissent ultimately

83Id.
8

Id. at 2533.

85 id.

86Id. at 2534.
87

Id.
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) [hereinafter Hill].
89
Id. at 185.
9 Defenders 11, 127 S. Ct. at 2538 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
88

91Id.
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concluded the Supreme Court should have "remanded [the case] to the
EPA for further proceedings." 92
The dissent's reexamination of Hill considered two questions: "(1)
whether the ESA required a court to enjoin the operation of the nearly
completed Tellico Dam and Reservoir Project because the Secretary of the
Interior had determined that its operation would eradicate a small
endangered fish.. .and (2) whether post-1973 congressional appropriations
for the completion of the Tellico Dam constituted an implied repeal of the
ESA...."
In answering the first question, the Hill court said "the
language, history, and structure of the [ESA] indicates beyond doubt that
Congress intended Endangered Species to be afforded the highest of
priorities." 94 Section 7 of the ESA "admits of no exception." 95 The
Defenders II dissent opines whether "the agency action [in Hill] was
mandatory or discretionary" was of no concern. 96 Rather, the relevant
holding from Hill was that "section 7 of the ESA reveals an explicit
congressional decision to require agencies to afford first priority to the
declared national policy of saving endangered species." 97
In answering the second question posed in Hill concerning whether
"post-1973 congressional appropriations for the completion of the Tellico
Dam Project constituted an implied repeal of the ESA," 98 the Defenders II
dissent noted "the fact that we also concluded that the post-1973
congressional appropriations did not impliedly repeal the ESA provides no
support for the majority's contention that the obligations imposed by
section 7(a)(2) may be limited to discretionary acts." 99 Although it
seemed a strange result to halt "a virtually completed dam for which
Congress [had] expended more than $100 million" in favor of "protecting
the survival of a relatively small number of 3-inch fish," the Hill court
found "the explicit provisions of the Endangered Species Act require

92 Id. at

2539.

9 Hill, 437 U.S. at 156.
94
Id. at 174.
95 Id. at 173.
96

Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at 2540 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

9 Hill, 437 U.S. at 185.
98

Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at 2539 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hill, 437 U.S. at 156)..

9

Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at 2540 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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precisely that result." 00 The language of section 7 of the ESA is clear and
explicit in its command to federal agencies "'to insure that actions
authorized,funded, or carriedout by them do notjeopardize the continued
existence' of an endangered species or 'result in the destruction or
modification of the habitat of such species....',0o
The Defenders II dissent reviewed the ESA's history to see what
legislators had purposefully removed from earlier drafts of the act in order
to narrow and specify the act.102 The dissent found that earlier drafts
"'qualified the obligation of federal agencies,' but the 1973 Act
purposefully omitted 'all phrases which might have qualified an agency's
responsibilities."1 03 The dissent criticized the majority for reading an
exception into the ESA where it seemed clear that Congress did not intend
for there to be any exceptions for federal agencies.
The dissent reasoned Congress' intent was clear in that the ESA
should override any competing statute, so the CWA should yield to the
ESA. 104 However, if two statutes can coexist, then neither statute should
yield. 0 5 However, reconciling the ESA and CWA by relying on title 50,
section 402.03 of the Code of Federal Regulations is erroneous.106
Section 402.03 reads "section 7 and the requirements of this part apply to
all actions in which there is federal involvement or control."o While the
Defenders II majority interpreted this regulation to mean that section 7
applies only to discretionary federal action, the dissent interpreted this
regulation to mean that "section 7(a)(2) applies to discretionary federal
action, but not only to discretionary action."'
To support its interpretation of section 402.03, the dissent looked
to "the definition of 'action' in § 402.02 and the 'explanation for the scope

'"

Hill, 437 U.S. at 172-73.

'o' Hill, 437 U.S. at 173 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536) (emphasis in original).

Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at 2540-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at 2541 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hill, 437 U.S. at 18182)..
104 Defenders H, 127 S. Ct. at 2541.
1o5
106 Id.
102
103

id.

107
108

50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2007).
Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at 2542 (Stevens, J., dissenting)..
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of the term 'action" in section 402.0l."o9 Within these sources, the
dissent found "there was no intent to draw a distinction between
discretionary and non-discretionary actions.""10
These regulations
indicate section 7 applies to all federal actions, not just discretionary
actions.
In considering the conflict between the ESA and the CWA, the
dissent noted that "there are at least two ways in which the CWA and the
ESA can be given full effect without privileging one statute over the
other."I 1 The first way to harmonize the statutes is through the statutory
consultation process. The second way to harmonize the statutes is through
the EPA's regulations.
Under the first approach to harmonizing the ESA and the CWA,
the dissent suggested looking to the text of section 7(a)(2), which
provides that federal agencies will insure their actions do not adversely
impact endangered species and their habitats "in consultation with and
with the assistance of the Secretary.. .unless such agency has been granted
an exemption for such action by the Committee pursuant to subsection
h...." 2 When an agency proposes a transfer of NPDES authority, the
Secretary of the Interior will indicate whether the grant of permitting
authority will adversely affect any endangered species.1 3 If the grant of
permitting authority may affect an endangered species, "the agency must
formally consult with the Secretary."1 4 This consultation concludes with
a biological opinion, which indicates how the grant of permitting authority
might affect the endangered species and its habitat. "' If the conclusion of
the biological opinion is "that the agency action would put a listed species
in jeopardy," the "Secretary shall suggest those reasonable and prudent
alternatives which would not violate subsection (a)(2)...." 16 Under this
approach, "the consultation process would generate an alternative course
of action whereby the transfer could still take place-as required by section
'"Id.at 2543.
110Md.
1 Id. at 2544.
112 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
1 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c).
114 Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at
2545.
.1s16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
116 Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at 2545 (citing 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(b)(3)(A)).
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402(b) of the CWA-but in such a way that would honor the mandatory
requirements of section7(a)(2) of the ESA."" 7 Even if no reasonable and
prudent alternative surfaces, the Endangered Species Committee can grant
agencies an exemption to proceed with the action despite the action's
potential to eradicate an endangered species." Congress created the God
Committee to "[serve] as the final mechanism for harmonizing [the ESA]
and other federal statutes."" 9 "In short, when all else has failed, and two
federal statutes are incapable of resolution, Congress left the choice to the
Committee-not to this court; it did not limit the ESA in the way the
majority does today." 20
The second approach to reconciling the ESA and the CWA
involves the EPA's regulations. After a transfer of permitting authority,
"[the EPA] continues to oversee the state's discharge permitting
system."l21 In order to decide when the EPA may object to a state's
proposed permit, the EPA and the state enter a "Memorandum of
Agreement ("MOA") that sets forth the particulars of the [EPA's]
oversight duties." 22 The EPA "can use-and.. .has used -the MOA process
to structure its later oversight in a way that will allow it to protect
endangered species in accordance with section7(a)(2) of the ESA."' 2 The
MOA allows the ESA operate unobstructed "without restricting section
7(a)(2) in the way the court does." 24
In its fourth point, the dissent hypothesized that even if section
7(a)(2) is limited to discretionary federal actions, "it is clear that EPA's
authority to transfer permitting authority under section 402(b) is
discretionary."
"Mandatory" or non-discretionary actions are those
actions which a statute requires an agency "to undertake once certain
Defenders 11, 127 S. Ct. at 2546.
"' 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e). "Because of its authority to approve the extinction of an
endangered species, the Endangered Species Committee is colloquially described as the
"God Squad" or "God Committee." Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at 2546.
119Defenders II, 127 S. Ct.
at 2546-47.
120 Id. at 2547.
121 Id.
122
Id. See 40 C.F.R. § 123.24(a) (2006).
123 Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at 2547.123 Id.
24 Id. at 2548.
117

125 id.
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specified triggering events have occurred."l 26 A statute's use of the word
"shall" does not automatically make action under the statute nondiscretionary.127 The dissent noted even the majority "acknowledges that
the EPA must exercise 'some judgment in determining whether a State has
demonstrated that it has the authority to carry out § 402(b)'s enumerated
statutory criteria."'l28 Despite the majority's recognition that a transfer of
permitting authority requires some discretion, "in the very same breath,
the Court states that the dispositive fact is that 'the statute clearly does not
grant it the discretion to add another entirely separate prerequisite to that
list."'l29 According to the dissent, this waffling is a logical inconsistency
in the majority opinion.
The dissent concluded by discussing Chief Justice Burger's
majority opinion in Hill, which noted that "once the meaning of an
enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial
process comes to an end." 30 The Supreme Court had already interpreted
the ESA 30 years ago in Hill, but it "turn[ed] its back on the decision in
Hill and places a great number of species in jeopardy."1 3 ' The dissent
concludes the idea that "the requirements of § 7(a)(2) of the ESA do not
apply to its decision to transfer permitting authority under § 402(b) of the
CWA" is "contrary to the text of § 7(a)(2), [their] decision in the TVA v.
Hill, and the regulation on which the agency has since relied and upon
which the Court relies today."' 32 Therefore, the EPA was "arbitrary and
capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act...and [the dissent]
would remand to the agency for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion." 33
C. COMMENT

126

Id. at 2536.

17

Id. at 2548.

128 id.

129

Id. at 2548-49.

130

TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at 2550.

131

2 Id.

13

13Id.

at 25 50-5 1.
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The Supreme Court has traditionally attempted to give full effect to
apparently conflicting, but the Defenders H majority abandoned that
approach. The majority erroneously decided it could not reconcile the
Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act. Instead, the Defenders
II majority misplaced its reliance on federal regulations for assistance in
interpreting the statutes. This approach led the Supreme Court to render
the Endangered Species Act's mandate ineffective against the Clean Water
Act, weakening Congress' protection of endangered species. While the
Supreme Court had previously held in Hill v. TVA that "endangered
species are supposed to take priority over the 'primary missions' of federal
agencies," 134 the Defenders H majority ignored this imperative. The
Defenders II majority also criticized the Ninth Circuit for not remanding
the decision to the Environmental Protection Agency for the agency's
construction, but the majority failed to follow its own suggestion.
While there were many established alternatives the Supreme Court
could have taken to reconcile the ESA and the CWA, it chose the most
detrimental one: weakening the ESA's mandate that government agencies
consider how their actions might negatively impact endangered species
and their critical habitats. Despite Congress' express intent and the
Supreme Court's precedent in Hill that protecting endangered species is
one of the government's highest priorities, the Defenders H court
weakened the EPA's ability to protect endangered species.
There were several statutory opportunities in place that allowed the
EPA to oversee states' permit issuing systems. The first opportunity was
the ESA's consultation requirement in which a state would consult with
the Fisheries and Wildlife Commission to make sure that proposed permits
would not adversely affect endangered species. In this situation, the EPA
could have approved a transfer of permitting authority to the state, but
when a proposed permit arises that the EPA thinks might affect an
endangered species, the EPA could object to it.
Defenders H also could have relied on the Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA). This allowed the EPA and a state to decide the
criteria for permit granting. The EPA had used the MOA in the past to
force states to consider an issued permit's impact on an endangered
species or its habitat. Finally, the ESA created the Endangered Species
134

Hill, 437 U.S. at 185.
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Committee, intended to have the power to grant exemptions for action that
has the potential to harm an endangered species or its critical habitat. The
language of the ESA shows that Congress intended this committee to
decide whether to prioritize agency action or the protection of endangered
species.
The Defenders II majority ignored the more favorable
alternatives to harmonizing the ESA and CWA, and instead weakened the
ESA against precedent and Congress' intent.
The policy implications of weakening the ESA are substantial.
First, Congress realized that diversity of life (biodiversity) contributed
"enormous ecological, economic, scientific, aesthetic, cultural, and health
benefits" to people.
To halt the government activity destroying
biodiversity, Congress enacted the ESA to force federal agencies to
consider their action's impact on endangered species. After the Defenders
II decision, federal agencies can ignore the negative impact their nondiscretionary action will have on endangered species when granting
permitting authority to states under the CWA.
D. CONCLUSION
While the reasoning behind the chosen statutory constructions methods
of the Defenders II Majority is hazy, Congress' intent with the ESA was
clear: the ESA is supposed to override other statutory mandates. Congress
and the courts never intended for the category of "non-discretionary"
agency actions to have an exemption to the ESA. The Supreme Court
previously reaffirmed these ideas in TVA v. Hill stating "the language,
history, and structure of the ESA indicates beyond doubt that Congress
intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities"l 35
and section 7 of the ESA "admits of no exception."' 36 The Hill court
"held that the ESA 'reveals a conscious decision by Congress to give
endangered species priority over the primary missions of federal
If there were to be any exemption to the ESA, the
agencies."'
Endangered Species Committee was the high level authority capable of
giving that exemption. Five members of the Supreme Court have ignored
Hill, 437 U.S. at 180.
Id. at 174.173.
" Defenders II, 127 S. Ct. at 2538 (citing Hill, 437 U.S. at 185).

1'

36

'
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the economic, ecological, scientific, aesthetic, cultural and health value
that biodiversity adds to human life and have improvidently weakened the
ESA's broad mandate that preserves the organisms generating those
benefits.
JOE SCHLOTZHAUER
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